Reply to Review of Neither Brain nor Ghost
Teed Rockwell
Professor McCarthy1 has carefully read many passages in my book Neither Brain
nor Ghost (NBG), and clearly understands many of my main points. Unfortunately,
there are other passages throughout the book that she seems to have missed, which
contradict many of her criticisms. However, I have heard many of these criticisms
before, so I probably have not been clear enough on these points. I welcome the
opportunity to make further clariﬁcations.
I could respond to her objection that no one believes that the brain possesses
intrinsic causal powers by referring to the quotes from Jerry Fodor and Colin McGinn on pages 59 and 60. But my main point was that these kinds of concepts are
the only way to make sense out of metaphors like Dennett’s claim that “the Head
is Headquarters” or Paul Churchland’s description of the brain as “the seat of the
soul.” There are a variety of causal factors that are responsible for the experiences
we have. These include brain activity, other kinds of body activity, light bouncing
of objects, and the objects themselves. Why is it that we assume that the activities
within the brain “embody” experience, while these other factors only “cause” the
experience? Why is it that only causal activity within the skull is given this special
honoriﬁc? The answer seems obvious until you ask the question. Once the question
is asked, the only answers available are the sort that McCarthy says no one would
accept: that the brain is autonomous, or a closed system, or has intrinsic causal
powers which make it fully responsible for the production of mental states. There
are quotes, in my book and elsewhere, which show that many philosophers and scientists do accept these answers. But the important point is that no other available
answer will support the claim that the mind is identical to the brain, regardless of
who acknowledges this fact. To some degree my book is a challenge to those who
defend mind/brain identity theory. “If you don’t use these criteria for determining
mind/brain identity, what criteria should we use?” My claim is that these kinds of
criteria, weak as they are, remain the only reasons we have for believing that the
mind is identical to the brain.
McCarthy frets about my “insouciance about the intricate processes in the
brain that are necessarily involved in the generation of the conscious experience
of any organism.” I felt no need to add my voice to the chorus of wonder about the
brain’s intricacies, but that was not meant to imply disagreement. I felt a greater need
to deal with those marginalized biological facts about consciousness and cognition
E&C/Education and Culture 23 (1) (2007): 87–89 ♦ 87

88

♦ Teed Rockwell
which are not explainable solely by talking about the brain, because most people
don’t know about them, and because I believe they are philosophically important.
(They appear mostly in chapters 2, 3 and 10.) More importantly, as I explain on
page 30, the fact that these brain processes are necessary for conscious experience
does not mean that they are identical to conscious experience. Mind-Brain Identity
requires that those brain processes be both necessary and sufﬁcient. It is necessary
for your car to have spark plugs in order for you to drive it. But that doesn’t mean
the spark plugs are identical to the car, because owning a set of spark plugs is not
sufﬁcient to enable you to drive to work. So the question remains: Why is brain
activity identical to consciousness, and not just necessary for it? At what point does
the intricacy become both necessary and sufﬁcient, and why should we automatically assume that all of this intricacy will take place in the skull?
When most people get to this stage in the argument, they usually reply, as
McCarthy did, that, even if we can’t answer that question, we still need to make a
distinction between Mind and World for pragmatic reasons. She, Dewey and I all
agree that there is value in what McCarthy calls the “analytic distinctions of self and
world.” That is why I say this on page 104 of NBG: “To say that the mind emerges
from the brain-body-world nexus does not mean that there is no world, only a
mind. The line between the self and the world must always be drawn somewhere.
. . . That is what it means to live in a world.” I do not identify the mind with the
entire brain-body-world nexus, as McCarthy claims. I think what prompted her to
attribute this position to me was the qualiﬁers that were removed from the above
quote. I believe that the line between the self and world must be drawn somewhere at
any given moment. But this does not necessarily imply that there is a single place that
the line can be drawn for all conscious creatures, or for a single conscious creature
throughout its history. A great deal of useful scientiﬁc work can be done by drawing the line at the skull, but the scientiﬁc work I describe in my book needs to draw
the line in a variety of other places. I think the best way to account for both mainstream neuroscience and this other, more problematic work is to see the boundary
between self and world as ﬂexible. That is why I feel the mind is best described as
a “behavioral ﬁeld” rather than as an organ in the skull.
There is nothing mystical about this claim. Gravitational ﬁelds are every bit
as physical as falling apples, but our best science cannot fully explain the behavior
of falling apples without talking about ﬂuctuations with a ﬁeld. I am suggesting
that if our psychology ever becomes as sophisticated as our physics, we might end
up describing minds as similarly ﬂuctuating behavioral ﬁelds. We can ignore these
ﬂuctuations a great deal of the time. The assumption that the mind is nothing but an
organ in the skull will probably always be accurate enough for a variety of scientiﬁc
research, just as Einsteinian physics is not necessary for most engineering jobs. But I
believe that the future of cognitive science, and the resolution of certain philosophical puzzles, will require a subtler and initially more counterintuitive theory.
I could (and will) quibble about some of McCarthy’s other criticisms. She
implies that I am not aware that Searle’s “Background” is a set of non-intentional
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capacities, although I devote pages 141–148 to explaining why Searle disagrees with
both Dewey and me on this issue. She then claims that I have no right to use my
amended version of Searle’s concept because he is an internalist and I am an externalist, but gives no support for this. McCarthy also accuses me of having “limited
acquaintance with requisite scientiﬁc knowledge,” an accusation that is probably
true of me and of anyone else who has written a multidisciplinary work of this sort.
However, she does not cite a single factual error in support of this accusation. If she
knows of some, I would like to hear about them. She also says that my criticism of
Searle’s distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative properties rests entirely
on a few comments about the nature of entropy and energy, although the argument
is actually three pages long, and makes several other points. Finally, Searle’s distinction between brute and institutional facts is not limited to questions of syntax,
as she claims, but includes all properties that presuppose the existence of purpose,
including biological properties like being a lung.
However, my intention has been not so much to criticize Professor McCarthy’s
criticism as to make my own position clearer. I appreciate her willingness to question
and challenge what is still very much a theory in progress, and I hope my replies will
make it easier for future development and understanding of these new ideas.
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